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DEAL-MAKING IN WHITEHALL: COMPETING AND COMPLEMENTARY 
MOTIVES BEHIND THE REVIEW OF SUB-NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND REGENERATION 
 
Sarah Ayres and Ian Stafford 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose - The aim of this article is to explore Whitehall motivations underpinning the 
Sub-national Review of Economic Development and Regeneration. 
Design/methodology/approach - It is based on interviews conducted with senior 
Whitehall officials involved in regional working. Findings - The Sub-National 
Review seeks to streamline regional structures and provide regions with enhanced 
autonomy. However, findings indicate that there are distinct differences of opinion 
across Whitehall departments regarding the future trajectory of English regionalism 
and what powers and functions regional bodies should acquire. These contradictory 
positions raise questions about the implementation and effectiveness of the proposals. 
Originality/value - An examination of these phenomena is intended to provide 
greater clarity regarding the opportunities and constraints presented by the latest 
phase of regional restructuring.  
Type of paper: Research paper Key words: English regionalism, Whitehall, Sub-
national Review, inter-governmental relations, governance, partnerships  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1997 the English regional tier has grown in institutional size and complexity. It 
has, however, evolved as the result of a ‘mish-mash’ of top-down decentralising 
initiatives and bottom-up coordinating programmes - what Stoker (2005: 158) refers 
to as ‘New Labour's rather chaotic top-down approach to decentralisation’. The 
Government’s motives associated with modernisation and productivity have received 
consistent support, championed largely by a ‘beefed up’ Treasury and influential 
Cabinet Office. By contrast, in the absence of cross-departmental support, the 
democratic strand of New Labour’s regional agenda has moved, as Sandford and 
Hetherington (2005: 95) note, at a ‘snail’s pace’ and even by the first referendum in 
the North East in November 2004 elected regional government remained ‘a semi-
detached policy’ (ibid). Indeed, the failed North East referendum left an opening a for 
a lively debate in which different stakeholders began to express their preference for 
the future of English regionalism.  
 
The Government responded by enhancing the responsibilities of the regional tier 
through promoting local flexibilities in the context of national performance incentives 
(HMT and Cabinet Office, 2004), acknowledging the important role of the regions in 
achieving policy integration (DTI et al, 2006; Sustainable Development Commission, 
2005) and providing regions with greater discretion over expenditure and taking 
account of priorities expressed by regional stakeholders (HMT et al, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the status of the English regions was being challenged. Emerging 
evidence questioned the ‘economic dividend of regionalism’ and the lack of progress 
made in meeting the Government’s target to reduce economic disparities between 
regions (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Morgan, 2006; Burch et al, 2008a). Regional 
structures were also criticised as ineffective and lacking leadership (Audit 
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Commission, 2006; Pearce and Ayres, 2007) and ‘city regions’ received increasing 
attention as a more suitable territorial scale to promote economic development (New 
Local Government Network, 2005).  
 
As part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), the Chancellor 
announced that the Government would undertake a review of sub-national governance 
structures in England. The Review’s remit was to explore ways to ‘improve the 
economic planning and decision-making processes at the regional level…through 
better alignment of regional strategies, enhancing the strategic role of Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), improving RDA capacity, efficiency and 
effectiveness and increasing regional accountability’ (HMT, 2007). The Sub-National 
Review (SNR) was published in July 2007 and represents the most recent statement of 
New Labour’s intentions for the English regions. Six months later the Government 
published Taking forward the Review of Sub-National Economic Development and 
Regeneration (DCLG and DBERR, 2007:3), which set out a broad timetable for SNR 
implementation and promised a ‘full consultation document to be published early in 
2008’.  
 
The consultation document, Prosperous Places (DCLG and DBERR, 2008), was 
published in March 2008 alongside related DCLG reports on ‘the economics of why 
place matters’ (DCLG, 2008a: 7); ‘the range and types of economic assessments 
currently being produced at the local and sub-regional level’ (DCLG, 2008b: 4) and 
‘clarifying the role and potential of sub-regional working in planning policy and 
decision-making’ (DCLG, 2008c: 3). These documents were intended to provide the 
political and institutional context within which stakeholders would develop their SNR 
submissions. In addition, Prosperous Places sought to bring further clarity to the 
reforms and invited views on key aspects. Significantly, though the document 
maintained the stress on the economic agenda evident in the SNR, its tone was 
different - the outcome of political wrangling and discussions within Whitehall over 
both the policy objectives of the reforms and institutional arrangements.  
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the rationale underpinning these proposals and 
assess their implications for regional institutions and policy making. It is based on 
interviews conducted between Summer 2007 and Spring 2008 with senior Whitehall 
officials involved in regional working. Interviewees were asked about departmental 
aspirations for regional reforms, how they viewed the proposals in the SNR and the 
likely impacts on regional policy and institutions. The paper is in five sections. After 
this introduction the next section examines the structure and remit of the SNR Cross-
Whitehall Programme Board, which was set up to facilitate discussions between 
government departments. Section three explores the different departmental positions 
underpinning the SNR. Section four examines discussions between departments in the 
period between the publication of the SNR in July 2007 and the consultation 
document Prosperous Places in March 2008. We conclude by reflecting on the 
consequence of Whitehall’s divergent views on the SNR reforms and its continued 
ambivalence to the future of English regionalism.  
 
THE SNR CROSS-WHITHALL PROGRAMME BOARD 
 
In 2007 a ‘SNR Cross Whitehall Programme Board’ was set up to guide discussions 
around SNR proposals and their implementation. The Departments for Business, 
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Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) (previously Department for Trade and 
Industry until June 2007) and Communities and Local Government (DCLG) were 
given joint responsibility for taking the lead, with the Treasury as a key partner. In 
addition, the Departments for Work and Pensions (DWP), Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS), Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Transport (DfT), 
Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and Children, Schools and Families 
(DCSF) were invited to participate (DIUS and DCSF were previously the Department 
for Education and Skills until June 2007). Interestingly, the Department of Health 
(DoH) and Home Office (HO) were not party to these negotiations because neither 
department considered that their regional remit was sufficient to warrant participation. 
A DoH official explained ‘the SNR was not of immediate interest to the Department 
of Health but we were supportive of the intent’. Indeed, a DCLG official explained 
that the Programme Board ‘focussed on those departments that would actually clear 
the final product [the SNR] and the consultation paper’.  
 
The Board was chaired by the Director General of Local Government and 
Regeneration in DCLG who was appointed as the senior reporting officer to the 
Treasury and Secretaries of State for DCLG and DBERR. The Board’s brief was to 
provide a forum for discussion amongst relevant departments and ‘to try to resolve 
tricky issues and air concerns amongst key Whitehall colleagues’ (DCLG official). 
Evidence indicates that much of the ground work, including policy proposals, had 
already been drafted by officials within the Treasury (Townsend, 2007). Indeed, the 
focus of the Board was not to suggest alternatives but to ‘secure buy in, feed in ideas 
about refining proposals and take forward the SNR in terms of implementation’ 
(DCLG official).  
 
In terms of departmental involvement, those charged with coordinating the Board 
indicated that outside the ‘core three’ departments, DEFRA was the most proactive, 
spurred on by a remit to ensure that economic growth should be achieved while 
adhering to the principles of sustainable development. DIUS and DWP’s engagement 
was largely centred on discussions associated with Regional Funding Allocations 
(RFAs) (HMT et al, 2005), which were included as part of the SNR proposals. The 
first round of RFAs in 2005 involved indicative funding allocations for transport, 
housing and economic development within which regional partners were invited to 
jointly advise ministers on spending priorities through to 2007-08 and to prepare 
indicative planning assumptions up to 2016. Regional actors were also asked to 
consider the scope for vireing (or transferring) allocations between budget headings, 
where this would assist integration. A second round of RFAs was announced as part 
of the SNR with skills and employment policy mooted for inclusion. Nonetheless, 
despite Treasury efforts both DIUS and DWP resisted the move, fearing virement and 
loss of control to regional bodies (HMT et al, 2008).  
 
The transfer of funds from the Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs) to local 
authorities for skills programmes for 14-19 year olds proved to be the priority concern 
for DCSF, while DCMS was eager to ensure that cultural issues would be recognised 
in any new regional settlement. DCLG, DBERR and DfT were supportive of 
measures to reduce institutional complexity at the regional tier, with DCLG keen to 
strengthen the role of local authorities and DBERR enthusiastic to maximise the 
influence of RDAs.   
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DEPARTMENTAL POSITIONS ON SNR PROPOSALS 
 
The SNR incorporated a range of reforms to promote economic development and 
regeneration at the sub-national tier. The following discussion identifies key elements 
and examines departmental positions and preferences. Some of the detail regarding 
the implementation of the proposals has been purposefully omitted to avoid 
duplication with other papers in this special issue. The discussion is framed under the 
following headings:  
 Abolition of Regional Assemblies, 
 New role for RDAs in drafting Single Regional Strategies (SRSs), 
 New powers for local authorities to promote economic development and scrutinise 
RDAs, 
 Enhanced emphasis on Multi Area Agreements (MAAs), and 
 Stronger accountability of RDAs to central government.  
 
Abolition of Regional Assemblies 
 
The regional tier represents a congested institutional landscape. Uncertainties have 
arisen over the respective roles of Assemblies, RDAs, Regional Government Offices 
(GOs) and other public bodies operating in the regions and the status of the 
multiplicity of regional strategies that have emerged in recent years. Particular 
attention has focused on the relationship between the Regional Spatial Strategies 
(RSS) - drafted by the Assemblies and the Regional Economic Strategies (RES) - 
developed by RDAs. Whitehall officials also expressed concerns that the activities of 
regionally-based quangos were not always aligned, and ‘do not necessarily contribute 
to meeting regional objectives’ (DBERR official). In its submission to the SNR 
consultation the Audit Commission (2007a: 10) stated that, 
 
‘In the absence of a clear framework, the result has been a complex and 
confusing picture of a multi-layered, fragmented array of bodies with 
overlapping responsibilities and strategies, multiple and complex networks, 
relationships and partnerships’.  
 
As a consequence, Whitehall officials from all departments expressed a desire to 
streamline regional structures and improve performance by reducing complexity in 
the regions.  
 
‘The Sub-national Review in its inception was born out of a desire to get to 
grips with on all of the initiatives and devolved decision making arrangements 
that the government has introduced since 1997. Quite often regional bodies 
overlap each other. We have done a review, which looks at how that might be 
managed better’ (Treasury official). 
 
A DCLG official confirmed the Treasury’s appetite for simplification stating that 
‘there is an attraction in the Treasury to things that look dynamic and regional 
structures can’t look dynamic through the undergrowth of bureaucracy’. The result is 
that ‘Regional Assemblies in their current form and function will not continue’ (HMT 
et al, 2007: 95). Indeed, they are to be abolished by 2010 and their strategic planning, 
transport and housing functions transferred to the RDAs. Within this congested 
institutional landscape, Assemblies, in particular, have found it difficult to manage the 
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tensions and ambiguities surrounding their responsibilities. They have also been 
unable to effectively balance fragmented interests and promote greater regional 
awareness (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2007) and in some regions have failed to 
attract strong support from either local authorities or the business community (Audit 
Commission, 2007b).  
 
However, plans to abolish Assemblies received different levels of support across 
Whitehall. For some Whitehall officials the decision was clear cut. A DBERR official 
confirmed it was about ‘simplification and removing the complexity in making hard 
decisions’. In a similar vein, a DfT official described existing regional structures as a 
‘two-headed monster’ and opined that abolishing Assemblies and strengthening 
RDAs would make it ‘easier’ for them to engage with regional structures. By contrast, 
DEFRA was concerned that, in the absence of Assemblies, there would be no 
organisation to champion sustainable development in the regions. The Assemblies 
currently produce Regional Sustainability Development Frameworks and provide a 
conduit for Regional Sustainability Round Tables to participate in regional strategy 
making. In their absence, the skills, expertise and influence of these interests could be 
lost (Jones, 2008).  
 
The DCLG was also reluctant to see Assemblies abolished. Indeed, one DCLG 
official claimed that the Department had lobbied hard to retain Assemblies on the 
grounds that they provided an important platform for representing regional interests 
and avoiding local authority turf wars. 
 
‘We argued for the status quo. We argued that the status quo isn't great. It's 
messy and it isn't where we wanted it to be but then we did not want to lose 
the North East referendum. But we need something to sort out [local authority] 
parochialism’ (DCLG official).  
 
Once DCLG realised, in the face of Treasury and DBERR opposition, that they had 
effectively ‘lost that battle’, the Department then lobbied for a local authority majority 
on the RDA Boards on the grounds that this would confirm greater democratic 
legitimacy on an empowered quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organisation 
(QUANGO). However, this proposal was rejected by the Treasury, which wanted to 
maintain the Agencies’ business led approach.  
 
Somewhat unexpectedly concerns were expressed within DWP about granting RDAs 
additional powers. Indeed, one senior official from the department favoured the 
elimination of the RDAs rather than Assemblies on the grounds that,  
 
‘It is increasingly difficult to get RDAs to have a set of policies consistent 
with national policies and that is one of the reasons we got involved in the 
SNR. The point of the SNR was to get decisions made at the most appropriate 
level and we proposed the abolition of RDAs but that was rejected’.  
 
A DCLG official, however, confirmed that the DWP’s preference was never fully 
articulated, 
 
‘It was a very fanciful position and never really a political reality. I think that 
it illustrates that there is not much point in a department having a view if they 
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haven’t worked out the mechanisms to seek influence.’ 
 
The removal of Assemblies has a number of policy implications. For example, the 
SNR states that ‘regions will be expected to work with key stakeholders to set out 
plans for housing growth that meet regional demographic pressures, and help tackle 
affordability and the national under-supply of housing’ (HMT et al, 2007: 93). For 
some observers the decision to abolish the Assemblies can be seen as a central 
government measure to remove an obstacle in the way of increasing the supply of 
land for housing, especially in south-east England.  However, there was no consensus 
among Whitehall officials that proposals to transfer the regional planning function to 
the RDAs would ease the shortage of new housing. Indeed, a Regional Coordination 
Unit (RCU) official felt that without the mediating hand of Assemblies, in which local 
government representatives form a majority, there could well be arguments about 
future housing land allocations.   
 
“If you do not have a regional apparatus then big local authorities, like Essex 
and Hertfordshire, could well say ‘those are our numbers and we are under no 
pressure at all to increase them’. Whereas, with the Regional Assemblies 
around, the other counties were saying ‘sorry guys that is not a tenable 
position because you load all the pressure on us and we have got to deal with 
this collectively’. So, that will be lost”. 
 
A further issue relates to the important role that the business, voluntary and 
community sectors - Social and Economic Partners (SEPs) - have played in shaping 
regional policy (House of Commons Justice Select Committee, 2008). The 
disbandment of Assemblies could mean that SEPs have no platform from which to 
influence regional debates, thus ‘weakening their input into the policy process in 
crucial areas such as planning, housing, environmental protection and sustainability’ 
(Mrinska, 2008: 13). The SNR stated that RDAs and local authorities will have to 
consult relevant interest groups in the development of their plans. Nonetheless, it 
offers no promise of resources or administrative support. A recent report by the New 
Local Government Network (NLGN) states that new ‘expert advisory’ arrangements 
should be developed by RDAs to ensure that they make the best use of expertise from 
partners across the regions (Leslie, 2008). As yet, there is no firm guidance from 
central government on this issue and there is a danger that valued partners may 
become disillusioned and withdraw their participation in regional forums.  
 
New role for RDAs in drafting  Single Regional Strategies  
 
The decision to strengthen RDAs and charge them with producing a SRS was 
underpinned by a number of government aspirations, including a desire to: 
 Enhance sub-national discretion (National Audit Office, 2003), 
 Tackle regional economic disparities (HMT et al, 2006a), 
 Streamline the ‘targetry’ system,   
 Reduce the number of regional strategies, and  
 Improve the regional evidence base (HMT et al, 2006b; Allsopp, 2004; OECD, 
2006).    
 
These motivations have shaped the new responsibilities for RDAs. Indeed, the SRS ‘is 
intended to give regions greater flexibility to determine the detailed working 
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arrangements for preparing the strategy and implementation plan’ (DCLG and 
DBERR, 2008: 33). However, a number of discrepancies are apparent. In a bid to 
streamline the complex targeting system, the RDAs’ existing tasking framework is to 
be replaced with a simplified ‘outcome and growth-focussed framework, defined by a 
single over-arching growth objective’ (HMT et al, 2007: 93). So, rather than being 
accountable to a range of Whitehall departments, RDAs will be solely accountable to 
DBERR for delivering the new growth objective. RDAs will also be the principal 
delivery agents for delivering the Government’s Regional Economic Performance 
Public Service Agreement (PSA), which will replace the existing array of PSAs and 
outcome targets that currently dictate RDA activities. This provides the Agencies with 
a much clearer focus on economic productivity, but Whitehall officials expressed 
reservations about whether RDAs could rise to the challenge. A RCU official 
explained that,  
 
‘There are long-standing concerns about delivering on PSAs and regional 
economic growth targets. If you look at the evidence, we are not as productive 
as some of our competitors and that will be difficult for RDAs to turn around’.  
 
The RDAs’ proposed new roles also raise questions about the social and 
environmental aspects of the SRS in the context of the Government’s aspiration to 
achieve sustainable development. A Treasury official responded to these concerns by 
stating that, 
 
‘There are two things to say with regards the possibility of losing the 
sustainability focus. The first is that a strong local authority input and input 
from other agencies should act as a check against that and the sign off from 
DCLG. The other thing is that it is quite clear that the Regional Strategy will 
need to cover economic, social and environmental objectives in a sustainable 
way. The RDAs’ £2.3 billion pot of money is specifically focussed on 
economic development but they can incorporate sustainable development by 
working with other agencies in the regions’. 
 
Indeed, the expectation is that the SRS will set out the economic, environmental and 
social objectives across related policy areas for each region. For some commentators 
the ‘integration of housing planning, transport and economic development is long 
overdue’ (Clark, 2008: 108). As Marshall (2008: 102) notes, ‘if the greater and more 
coherent clout of the RDAs can give better results [in terms of integration], this might 
be worthwhile’. However, there are concerns about the capacity of RDAs to take on 
these functions. For example, a DCLG official was circumspect about the inclusion of 
sustainability in the SRSs, stating that ‘the Treasury is about jobs, we are about 
housing and I’m not sure that environment comes very far up DBERR’s radar’. 
 
Anxieties have also been articulated in DCLG about how RDAs are to combine their 
responsibilities as future regional planning bodies with their economic development 
role. There are already staff secondments from Assemblies and local government to 
RDAs but the expectation is that the Agencies will need to adapt their organisational 
culture considerably and develop a new skills set in order to take on this task. As a 
DCLG official noted, ‘Our view is that the RDAs do need to change and in essence, 
we are setting up new RDAs’. Nonetheless, one might question how amenable 
business-led RDAs will be to this transformation.      
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In Whitehall, the SRSs will be signed off jointly by the Secretaries of State for 
DBERR and DCLG. Nonetheless, there appears to be some confusion in Whitehall 
about these arrangements. Treasury, DBERR, DCLG and RCU officials were 
absolutely clear that the joint sign off would not lead to tensions between 
departments. For them, it was unambiguous that DBERR will have control over the 
economic and DCLG over the spatial elements of the strategies. However, interviews 
with DEFRA and DWP officials indicated that they view the SRS as more of a ‘cross-
departmental sign-off’. As a DWP official explained, ‘I think the strategy will involve 
a collective cabinet decision and I suspect DWP will be involved and I suspect there 
will be tensions’. Likewise, a DEFRA official indicated,  
 
‘Although DBERR and DCLG sign off the new Regional Strategy, 
consultation on it with other departments is extensive and there is no way they 
would sign it off if a DEFRA minister was raising serious concerns. But, there 
has to be a single nominated Secretary of State, where the buck stops for legal 
reasons’.     
 
How the practicalities of this joint sign off will work in practice remains to be seen. In 
addition, Prosperous Places indicated that Whitehall will approve regional strategies 
in ‘two months’ (DCLG and DBERR, 2008: 35) - a timeframe that appears highly 
ambitious given the fact that the South East’s most recent RSS has been under review 
by DCLG for over two years. 
       
New powers for local authorities to promote economic development and scrutinise 
RDAs  
 
The decision to grant local authorities new powers to promote economic development 
was prompted by a number of factors. The SNR states that: 
 
‘Globalisation and technological change mean that regions and localities need 
the tools and incentives to build on their indigenous assets so that they can 
respond quickly to changing economic circumstances if they are to increase 
prosperity’ (HMT et al, 2007: 7). 
 
The emphasis on local incentives, bottom up policies and building on indigenous 
assets draws on many of the themes identified in the new regionalist literatures (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1993) that shaped plans for the introduction of 
RDAs in 1999. More recently, the Devolving Decision Making series (HMT et al, 
2004; HMT and Cabinet Office, 2004) recognised that localities need greater 
flexibilities and powers if they are to achieve economic growth. Combined with this 
approach was a desire in government to respond to the city region agenda and 
introduce structures that would allow localities to operate at multiple spatial scales, 
dictated by functional and evidence based rationales for action (HMT et al, 2006b). 
As a DCLG official stated, ‘we wanted to get away from the notion of a one size fits 
all. We wanted a multi-scalar approach based on good economic sense’. 
 
There were, however, differences between departments about the appropriate 
territorial scales to which responsibilities and funding should be decentralised. The 
Treasury and DBERR placed a strong emphasis on city regions as part of the 
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economic productivity agenda. DEFRA recognised the potential importance of the 
regional tier in dovetailing social, economic and environmental concerns in a bid to 
achieve sustainable development (DTI et al, 2006). DfT, DIUS and DWP operate at 
multiple sub-national scales and were keen to ensure that decentralisation occurs at an 
appropriate level but ‘within the confines of nationally agreed frameworks’ (DIUS 
official), while DCLG flagged up the important contribution of local authorities to the 
achievement of national and regional objectives.  
 
A further issue concerned the perceived regional democratic deficit. The November 
2004 referendum left policy makers with a dilemma - how best to achieve their aims 
for English regionalism under administrative as opposed to devolved governance. 
Regional government was intended to facilitate improved decision-making, policy 
coordination, better management of resources and more efficient programme delivery 
(Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) and Whitehall now had to find a way to deliver these 
objectives with the limited tools available. A DCLG official noted that, 
 
‘the Government wanted to meet the commitments it made in the 2002 White 
Paper Your Region, Your Choice [Cabinet Office and DTLR, 2002] but it 
faced a problem in that the only body it could decentralise to was a quango 
[the RDAs]’.  
 
As a consequence, it was accepted that any new settlement aimed at decentralising 
further powers would have to be matched with efforts to ensure greater accountability.  
In response to these challenges, the SNR stated that ‘local authorities are to be 
strengthened and given better incentives to work with their local partners to deliver 
improved performance on economic development and neighbourhood renewal’ (HMT 
et al, 2007: 71). The new proposals will require local authorities (individually or 
jointly) to carry out an assessment of the economic circumstances of their locality, 
which will feed into the process of drafting the SRSs. Proposals also include a more 
central role for local authorities in scrutinising the work of the RDAs.  
 
Local authorities have broadly welcomed these proposals. However, there are 
disagreements about what template might be used for the economic assessments. One 
option is that local authorities will decide for themselves what information and criteria 
might be used, based on the work that many have already undertaken. However, a 
recent DCLG (2008b: 4) study indicates that ‘the depth of analysis in assessments and 
their contribution to strategy development varies considerably’, raising questions in 
Whitehall about local authority capacity. A second option, favoured by DBERR, 
would entail enforcing a standard template that would assist in reducing 
inconsistencies and be designed to meet the RDAs’ requirement. Nonetheless, this 
second option runs the risk of placing additional and unwanted demands on local 
authorities (Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 2008).  
 
The economic assessments are intended to enable local authorities to make a more 
informed case for resources. There is an assumption that economic assessments will 
also form an evidence base to shape priorities within the SRS. Nonetheless, the SRS 
must incorporate a multitude of policy issues, relating to housing, planning and 
environmental concerns, thus potentially limiting the prospective influence of local 
authorities. Moreover, while the SNR outlines an important role for local authorities 
in the consultation for the SRS it does not offer them a veto, as a DBERR official 
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described, ‘Local authorities are to be consulted but they will not have a veto. So, in a 
sense they will have one bite at the cherry but the RDAs will decide’.  
 
Finally, the SNR clearly states that RDAs will be ‘expected to delegate delivery 
responsibilities where possible, unless there are clear reasons for not doing so, such as 
weaknesses in local authority capacity’ (HMT et al, 2007: 88). Nonetheless, a failure 
to clearly articulate priority areas for investment could potentially threaten the 
delivery role of local authorities. Our interviews with Whitehall departments indicated 
that ‘the Treasury does not want jam spreading’ (DBERR official). In other words, it 
wants investment to go where it makes best economic sense and that does ‘not mean 
all local authorities getting a slice of the cake’ (Treasury official). In this argument 
evidence based rationality outweighs democratic or spatial equity considerations. This 
poses a significant dilemma for local authorities. On the one hand they have an 
obligation to make the case for investment in their own areas, while at the same time 
agreeing a common ‘regional’ position to lobby the RDA. If they fail to collectively 
agree on investment priorities, it might give the RDAs an excuse to hold on to 
resources and delivery responsibilities.  
 
Enhanced emphasis on Multi Area Agreements (MAAs) 
 
The SNR emphasises the centrality of Multi-Area Agreements (MAAs) - ‘groupings 
of local authorities coming together on a voluntary basis for a three year period to 
agree collective targets and performance indicators, rather than having individual 
targets in separate Local Area Agreements’ (HMT et al, 2007: 89). MAAs represent a 
departure from economic development initiatives constrained by regional 
geographical boundaries. The term multi-scalar is used to describe these arrangements 
that potentially include city-regions and surrounding shire counties. However, a 
DCLG official was of the opinion that MAAs would mostly involve city regions, 
although, in his view, this ‘term is out of the window because it is seen to marginalise 
peripheral and rural areas’. Hence, while the SNR refers to MAAs, there is perhaps an 
underlying assumption or acceptance in Whitehall that this really means ‘city 
regions’, dressed up in a more palatable label for rural areas.  
 
The SNR states that MAAs should:  
 Be voluntary, 
 Focus on evidence based activity that adds greatest value at the sub or city-
regional scale, 
 Concentrate primarily upon economic development, 
 Be subject to shared and collective responsibility amongst partners, 
 Have transparent arrangements for accountability, 
 Include representatives from business and RDAs and where relevant, include both 
tiers of local government, 
 Be based on functional economic areas, 
 Be consistent with regional strategies and local Sustainable Community Strategies 
and complement Local Area Agreements, and  
 Build on existing sub-regional partnerships (Burch et al, 2008a: 25).  
 
Thirteen sub- and city-regional groupings have been working on proposals that were 
considered in the first round of MAAs (DCLG, 2007). These are dominated by areas 
that have a track record of collaboration, including Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds and 
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Sheffield. Indeed, this situation was predicted by a DBERR official, who felt that 
existing city-region arrangements would spearhead the proposals, 
 
‘What we didn’t want to do in the SNR was lose the good work that already 
exists at a city-region level. It is right and proper that these arrangements 
should form the basis of MAAs and be at the forefront of the proposals’.    
 
However, of the thirteen, only seven have been signed off by the Government’s 
original deadline of June 2008, with the others due for completion by spring 2009. A 
Treasury official noted that MAAs need to meet strict criteria as ‘RDAs do not want 
to devolve where groups of local authorities have not got capacity or willingness’. 
The same official argued that ‘some councils just aren’t ready to take up that level of 
responsibility and the RDAs will need to work with them to bring them up to speed’. 
However, an RCU official was more circumspect about the ability of RDAs and local 
authorities to work together, stating that ‘local authorities are wrong to expect RDAs 
to automatically devolve. There will undoubtedly be battles to make this happen’. 
Following the sign off of the seven MAAs, DCLG (2008d) announced that,  
 
‘In a contract with Government, councils working together with local agencies 
- from Greater Manchester to the South Coast - will get more freedoms from 
Whitehall in return for pledging a local, partnership approach to boost 
economic growth and tackle deprivation and financial inequalities’.  
 
However, MAAs will not have a direct line of contact with Whitehall and must 
engage with regional structures, most notably RDAs and GOs, to achieve their 
objectives.  
  
‘The MAAs will be approved by the GOs but how much money they get will 
depend on their discussions with RDAs. MAAs must buy into the SRS. That is 
why the option of going to Whitehall has been got rid of because you can’t 
plan piecemeal’ (DBERR official).     
 
A further step could be the establishment of statutory, legally-binding city-regional 
structures empowered to deal with economic development. This ‘would enable 
funding and responsibility to be devolved or delegated directly to the sub-region, 
rather than to individual local authorities’ (Burch et al, 2008b: 6). While this can be 
viewed as an opportunity to strengthen MAAs and secure greater policy discretion, 
our interviews revealed reluctance in government to grant genuine autonomy. For 
example, when probed about levels of ministerial support for the SNR, an official on 
the Whitehall Programme Board indicated that ‘given the nature of the subject there 
hasn’t been a great deal of enthusiasm amongst ministers for this piece of work’. The 
official indicated that the Secretary of State for DCLG has been ‘keen to push the 
local authority devolutionary agenda, which has driven her involvement in SNR 
discussions’. However, a DCLG official set out the political barriers to greater sub-
national discretion, particularly over finance. 
 
“RDAs and MAAs are still constrained by centrally determined regional 
growth targets. You will never get ministers who are ultimately providing the 
money accepting a degree of autonomy with what you might call 
‘regionalism’ or ‘devolution’. Because government provides 75% of the 
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money, ministers are held responsible. So, the SNR is not about devolution of 
powers. It’s almost an economic and spatial convenience because there has to 
be some level at which these activities are organised” (DCLG official).    
 
Stronger accountability of RDAs to central government 
 
The publication of The Governance of Britain Green Paper in July 2007 (Ministry of 
Justice, 2007) rekindled interest in notions of openness and accountability at the 
regional tier and in government more generally. This is especially interesting given 
that English regionalism has often been referred to as a game of two opposing 
agendas; Gordon Brown and the Treasury’s economic productivity agenda versus 
John Prescott’s democracy drive (Sandford, 2005). Nonetheless, one DCLG official 
noted that such accounts may be over simplistic, 
 
‘Since Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister in June 2007, there is an 
increased emphasis on promoting democracy at the regional level that wasn’t 
there eighteen months ago. But, what that means in practice remains to be seen’.  
 
In a bid to respond to the democratic deficit at the regional tier, regional ministers 
have been appointed. They are intended to provide a clear sense of strategic direction 
for their region, provide each region with a voice in central government and to make 
central government more evident in the regions (Ministry of Justice, 2007: 38). 
Nonetheless, when probed about the precise role of regional ministers a DCLG 
official confirmed that,  
 
‘Regional ministers will have a strong role in representing interests in their 
regions and championing the government in those regions and addressing 
barriers to delivery. They are not there to lobby central government on the 
regions’ behalf.’ 
 
This statement appears to confirm the top-down nature of the Ministers’ role. 
Although the Government has stressed that regional ministers should provide a 
stronger regional voice in Whitehall, questions remain over the time commitments, 
profile and enthusiasm of ministers to effectively deliver this pledge.  
 
Alongside regional ministers, in July 2008 the Government unveiled plans to establish 
eight regional select committees, with membership reflecting the membership of the 
House, and eight regional grand committees, to include all MPs from each region 
(Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, 2008). The Government ‘has 
indicated that regional committees together with regional ministers will allow greater 
public accountability of RDAs’ (Maer, 2008: 20). However, our interviews indicate 
concerns in Whitehall about the level of government resources required to facilitate 
the process, duplication with other select committees, the reluctance of regional 
bodies to cooperate and a lack of compatibility between scrutiny by local authorities 
at a regional level and by select committees at a national level. Moreover, there is 
firm resistance to any suggestions that regional ministers or select committees should 
interfere with the RDAs’ conventional lines of accountability to Whitehall. As a 
Treasury official commented, ‘regional ministers or select committees do not conflict 
or override the clear lines of accountability for RDAs we have sought to establish in 
the SNR. Accountability for RDAs rests with the Secretaries of State for DBERR and 
 13 
DCLG’.  
 
TAKING FORWARD THE SUB-NATIONAL REVIEW 
 
Following the publication of the SNR in July 2007, the SNR Programme Board began 
to receive informal soundings on the proposals from government departments and 
sub-national organisations. Its task was to take forward the proposals and, in the view 
of one member, ‘producing the consultation document [Prosperous Places] was a 
greater challenge than producing the SNR because we had to square some of the 
contradictions within the SNR and bring people on board’. Another member indicated 
that the Treasury had been keen to drive through the SNR proposals, perhaps without 
the full backing of Whitehall departments,  
 
‘I think it’s fair to say that the Treasury assumed that everyone had signed up 
to the SNR and I’m sure that there are e mails somewhere that tell us that. But, 
that is rather different from departments collectively or corporately signing up 
to it. For example, I think when DEFRA realised what someone on their 
behalf had signed up to in the SNR last summer they became quite concerned 
about the reshaping’. 
 
The upshot was that the Programme Board faced some difficult decisions in order to 
achieve buy-in across Whitehall. Interviews indicated that the following themes 
proved to be particular points of contention.   
 
Economic development vs Sustainability: As noted above, DEFRA was concerned that 
there was a tension in the SNR between economic growth and sustainability. 
Prosperous Places makes more reference to the notion of sustainability than the SNR 
and a DCLG official indicated that, in meetings with ministers, the Chair of the 
Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) was ‘quite positive and thought that it 
was an improvement on the original SNR with lots more clarity about how 
sustainability fits in’. The official view from the SDC was, however, less sanguine 
(SDC, 2008). Indeed, placing ‘sustainable’ in front of ‘economic development’ does 
not imply an integration of the concepts (Counsell and Haughton, 2006), while a 
DEFRA official observed that ‘RDAs have still to prove their commitment to 
sustainable growth’.    
 
Capacity concerns within RDAs: There were some tensions between DBERR and the 
Treasury, on the one hand, and DCLG on the other about how far RDAs should 
remain business-led bodies. DCLG judged that RDAs need to significantly adapt their 
skills profile and business culture if they are to become the regional planning body - a 
move that appears to have been successfully resisted by Treasury and DBERR in 
Prosperous Places.  
 
How to measure the capacity of sub-regional partnerships: The SNR left some 
uncertainty about how sub-regional groupings would demonstrate their capacity. 
DCLG’s preferred position is a presumption that RDAs will delegate funds unless 
there are extenuating circumstances. DBERR’s preference is that local authorities will 
need to make a formal case as to why they should be delegated responsibility. This is 
yet to be resolved and the issue formed a central thread of the consultation exercise.       
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Operation of local authority forums: There was a concern across all departments that 
local authority forums should not be ‘just an Assembly without SEPs’ (Treasury 
official). Whitehall wanted to make clear in Prosperous Places that they expect to see 
local authority leaders and Chief Executives get involved to reflect the importance of 
the Forums. The Treasury and DBERR also support a strong local authority role as 
they ‘have pushed really hard on delegation to RDAs and we know it can’t work 
without local authority buy-in’ (Treasury official).  
 
How to ensure the engagement of SEPs: Members of the Programme Board conceded 
that Prosperous Places ‘hasn’t gone into great detail about how we ensure 
stakeholders have a voice in the region’ (DCLG official). The view was that 
Whitehall wants to avoid dictating how partnerships and consultation should operate 
at a regional level. There have been no finite decisions on this issue, although it is 
something that the Board expects to feature quite strongly in submissions to the SNR 
consultation.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
While the SNR speaks of economic rationality and evidence based policy, our 
findings indicate that the trajectory of English regionalism is dictated by a highly 
politicised game that reflects deep rooted departmental positions, cultures and 
legacies. Evidence suggests that the SNR is a top-down Treasury driven agenda, 
focussed predominantly on enhancing economic productivity. While the Whitehall 
Programme Board undoubtedly had a role in thrashing out some of the detail, the 
future of English regionalism was ultimately determined by Treasury ministers and 
officials. Nonetheless, the Treasury did not have it all its own way. Some departments 
were better at resisting the reforms than others. For example, DWP and DIUS 
opposed the move to participate in the second round of regional funding allocations, 
despite a pledge in the SNR for them to do so (HMT et al, 2008). It would appear that 
even the Treasury finds it difficult to cajole the big delivery departments into regional 
working. Other departments, however, were less successful is resisting Treasury 
pressure. The slippery concept of sustainability proved difficult for DEFRA to 
uphold, while DCLG failed to win support for maintaining Assemblies or boosting 
local authority representation on RDA boards.     
 
Our evidence also reveals important differences of opinion across Whitehall about the 
future of English regionalism. While elements of the SNR proposals have won 
widespread support other aspects, such as empowering RDAs, have not and could 
well be (overtly or covertly) resisted in Whitehall. Different departmental positions 
reflect a desire by ministers to orchestrate a regional architecture that enables them to 
meet their own individual objectives - a situation emblematic of the ‘mish-mash’ of 
decentralising activities that Stoker (2005) describes. Indeed, while claiming the need 
for reforms at the centre, the SNR is almost silent on the changes required in 
Whitehall for the reforms to be effective. Despite significant governance changes at 
the sub-national tier, the fundamental accountability structures, policy controls and 
funding streams remain firmly in Whitehall. While ministerial rhetoric may 
emphasise decentralisation, the reality is that the SNR proposals will not lead to a 
significant redistribution of powers.  
 
 
 15 
In sum, the SNR proposals represent a set of reforms that lack an underlying logic and 
which are littered with ambiguities and contradictions. The big constitutional question 
about the future of the England post devolution in London and the devolved territories 
has not been addressed and there is no consensus in government about what the final 
constitutional settlement should be. New Labour’s reform agenda stalled at the 2004 
North East referendum and, in the absence of a constitutional master plan, the 
outcome has been a set of reactionary and incremental adjustments that lack strategic 
direction, buy-in and focus. In the short-term, English regionalism trundles on and 
there appears to be no emerging solution to match the constitutional settlements 
achieved elsewhere in the UK. With question marks over the ability of SNR to deliver 
policy effectiveness and economic growth and the Governance of Britain Green Paper 
to address the regional democratic deficit, the outstanding ‘English Question’ appears 
to be left unanswered.  
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